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MICHAEL G. HUELSHOFF & THOMAS PFEIFFER

Environmental policy in
the EC: neo-functionalist
sovereignty transfer or
neo-realist gate-keeping?
The European Community (EC) stands at an important crossroads. Despite delays and uneven implementation, the EC is
poised to move towards completing its Single Market Programme, and monetary union is to be realized by the end of the
decade. Additionally, for the first time in some time, members
are seriously discussing revisions to the Treaty of Rome that
would strengthen political integration and set in motion institutional reform, and initial steps to do so were taken at the Maastricht summit in December i991. Yet the EC was initially
designed to further economic integration among its members.
Original academic conceptions perceived the EC as a functional
institution, designed to enhance economic co-operation (in
order to tie together many of the combatants of World War
II so closely that in the future wars would be unlikely if not
impossible) without the need for closer institutional association.'
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Events quickly overtook such (in retrospect) naive academic
musings, and notions of integration that included expressly
political processes, working together with economic integration,
captured attention.2 These so-called neo-functionalist theories
fared as poorly as their functionalist predecessors, leading Ernst
Haas to proclaim the obsolescence of regional integration theory - and, by implication, regional integration - during the
economic instability of the 197os. 3 All this academic pessimism

has been overturned by the 1992 programme and the apparent
commitment of key EC member-states to expand regional integration.
The extent to which integration in Europe is leading to
the transfer of sovereignty from member-states to Community
institutions is a central question engendered by this renewed
drive towards greater regional integration in the EC. To explore
the issue of sovereignty transfer, this essay examines the development of environmental policy in the EC. The increase in environmental awareness among the general public has pushed the
EC to pursue environmental goals more aggressively, and the
Single European Act (SEA) proposes a balance between market
and environment. But as the act has been implemented to date
environmental policies have taken a back seat to economic integration. An 'environmentally friendly' Europe is unlikely to
2

See E.B. Haas, 'International integration: tile European and the universal process,' InternationalOrganization 15(summer 1961), 366-92, and Beyond the NationState (Stanford cA: Stanford University Press 1964); L.N. Lindberg, The Political
Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford CA: Stanford University
Press 1963), and 'The European Community as a political system,' Journal of
Common Market Studies 5Uune 1967), 344-87; L. Lindberg and S. Scheingold,
Europe's Would-Be Polily (Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall 197o); J. Caporaso,
'Encapsulated integrative patterns vs. spillover: the cases of agricultural and
transport integration in the European Economic Community,' International Studies Quarterly 14(December 1970), 361-94; J.S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and
Conflict in Regional Organizations (Boston: Little Brown 197 1); B.NM. RUssett,
'Transactions, community, and international political integration,' Journal of
Common Market Studies 9 (March 1971), 224-45; P. Schmitter 'Three neo-functional
hypotheses about international integration,' InternationalOrganization 2",3(winter 1969), 161-6.

3 The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theoty, Research Series 25 (Berkeley: Institute of international Studies, University of California, 1975).
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emerge in 1992 or thereafter until national publics make greater
demands on their governments for more protection of the environment and there is a greater willingness on the part of the
European Commission to balance market and environmental
goals.
Yet the politics of Ec environmental policy is not exclusively
a policy question. There are valuable lessons for theory in postSEA environmental policy. The politics of EC environmental
policy demonstrates the weaknesses of re-worked theories of
regional integration which emphasize neo-functionalist spillover
and the transfer of sovereignty to EC institutions. While the
balance between market and environment written into the Single European Act makes environmental policy seem a good
candidate for spillover and sovereignty transfer, to date there
. has been little spillover from the market-oriented elements of
the SEA into environmental policy. Rather, national sovereignty
remains a powerful force in EC politics, despite the 'Europhoria'
of recent years and the renewed drive towards greater political
integration in the EC.
This essay first reviews recent attempts to revive and reformulate integration theory. In particular, attention is focused on
the growing debate between those scholars who argue for a
return to neo-functionalist concepts and those who note the
continuing importance of national sovereignty and the gatekeeping role of national governments. The second section
describes the policy-making context in the Ec as it pertains
to environmental questions. Pro-growth interest groups at the
European level have found a sympathetic ear in the Commission,
at the expense of pro-environment groups. Yet the major actors
in the EC remain the nation-states, underscoring the importance
of the European Council and the Council of Ministers in determining the pace and direction of European environmental policy. The European Parliament, the main institution in which
environmental concerns are voiced, is structurally hampered
from taking a more forceful position and cannot itself balance
market and environment. The final section of the article demonstrates the effects of this distribution of political power in two
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areas of environmental concern - waste management and air
pollution - and explores the impact of the structural factors
discussed on these policy areas. The implications for integration
theory are examined in the conclusions.
1992 AND

INTEGRATION THEORY

The replacement of'Europessimism' with 'Europhoria' has generated a debate in academia. The dynamism of the 1992 project
and its related efforts to expand monetary and political cooperation in Europe have led scholars to reconsider the wisdom
of Haas's postmortem on regional integration. Smith and Ray
decry the demise of integration theory in United States political
science, arguing that even in the times when it seemed the EC
was stagnant, there was evidence of continued integration in
Europe, but they offer few specific suggestions as to what theoretical tools remain useful. In recent studies, Taylor and Tranholm-Mikkelsen both find evidence of spillover, a concept central to neo-functionalist theory. Sandholtz and Zysman focus
upon 'elite bargains formed in response to changes in the international structure and in the domestic political context.' They
believe these bargains involve interlocked trade-offs among
nations, resulting in the transfer of decision-making authority
to the Commission. While careful to evaluate neo-functionalism
and to note the difficulty of predicting continued co-operation,
Sandholtz and Zysman do share one belief with those arguing
for a reconsideration of neo-functionalism. They hold out the
possibility - however tentatively - of the development of a European single actor in international politics, implying a transfer of
4
sovereignty from member-states to the EC.
4 D.L. Smith and J.L. Ray, 'European integration: gloomy theory versus rosy
reality,' paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 31 August-3 September 1989; P. Taylor, 'The new
dynamics of E:c integration in the ig8os,' in J. Lodge, ed, The European Comnmunity and the Challenge of the Future (New York: St Martin's Press 1989), 3-25; J.
Tranhohn-Mikkelsen, 'Neo-functionalism: obstinate or obsolete? A reappraisal
in the light of the new dynamism of the E:C,' Millennium 20(spring 1991), 1-22;
W. Sandholtz and J. Zysman, '1992: recasting the European bargain,' World
Politics 42(October 1989), 95-1"28.
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Other scholars are more sceptical about the processes at
work in Europe and about their likely outcomes. In a study of
the formulation of the Single European Act, Moravcsik finds
that states were willing to pass little sovereignty to the Commission, even if agreeing to co-ordinate policy among themselves.
He argues that traditional concepts of power and national interest best describe developments in Europe. Keohane and Hoffmann are also somewhat doubtful about the prospects for longrange integration and sovereignty transfer in Europe. Busch
argues that there is an inherent contradiction between the
nation-state and integration, which nation-states have won in
the past and will continue to win in the future. 5 These perspectives are largely consistent with intergovernmentalism, which is
based in neo-realist international relations theory.6 From this
neo-realist perspective, states will maintain their gate-keeper
role in

EC

politics, limiting the transfer of sovereignty.

This debate suggests two rival hypotheses. If spillover and/
or interlocking trade-offs are common in the development of
European environmental policy, then sovereignty is being transferred to the EC. If states continue to be the focus of decisionmaking, then the EC might better be characterized as another
organization within which states interact, a 'concordance system'
7
in Puchala's terms.
5 A. Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community,' InternationalOrganization
45(winter 1991), 651-88; R.O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, 'Institutional change
in Europe in the 198os,' in Keohane and Hoffmann, eds, The New European
Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder co: Westview 1991),
1-4o; K. Busch, 'The conflict between nation-states and economic integration
in the European Community,' in B. Crawford and P. Schulze, eds, The New
Europe Asserts Itself"A Changing Role in InternationalRelations (Berkeley: University of California Press 1990), 153-78.
6 Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 'Neo-functionalism: obstinate or obsolete?' 8. For representative intergovernmentalists, see S. Hoffmann, 'Obstinate or obsolete? The
fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe,' Daedalus 95(1 966), 862915, and P. Taylor, The Limits of European Integration (London: Croom Helm
1983).
7 D. Puchala, 'Ofblind men, elephants and international integration,'Journal of
Common Market Studies io(March 1972), 267-84.
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Why environmental policy? Environmental issues were
explicitly included in the Rome treaties in ,987 with the ratification of the Single European Act, and there has been rapid growth
in public awareness about the environment during the past
decade. The relative success of environmental political parties in
the most recent election for the European Parliament, including

strong showings in France and the United Kingdom, underscores the growing importance of environmental politics in the
EC.

It is this recent addition of environmental issues to the

Rome treaties and the rapid growth in political awareness of
environmental problems which make these issues a strong candidate for explorations of sovereignty transfer in the EC.
THE POLITICS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY MAKING

IN

THE EC

The original Treaty of Rome included no provisions related to
the environment. In the late 195os, few environmental lobbies

were pressing for environmental protection and although wartime damage had largely been repaired, European states were
still far behind the United States in most major economic categories. Article i oo of the treaty specified that the Commission was
to work to harmonize members' policies to realize the internal
market. This article is broad enough to be interpreted both as
a means to develop a European environmental policy and as a
means to weaken national environmental laws that distort trade.
The remaining articles of the treaty with implications for the

environment included article 2, which sets the broad goal of
'balanced development,' and article 36, which allows members
to ban or restrict trade to protect public health, animals, and
plants. However, the treaty included very little that can be interpreted as pertaining to the environment - and nothing that
directly confronts the issue.
Environmental issues did not reach the bargaining table
until 1972 when the Council of Ministers voted to establish
an Environmental Action Programme (EAP), but environmental
policy developed only slowly thereafter. Not only was the timing
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poor - coming shortly before the 1973-4 oil crisis and subsequent
recession - but also the EC was running out of political steam.
Weakened by the French boycott in 1965, the Commission was
unable to maintain cohesion among its members after the Nixon
shocks of 1971 effectively ended the fixed exchange rate system.
The subsequent oil crisis set off inflationary pressures that tested
the political will of the European states. Indeed, Haas's observation that integration was 'obsolescent' in 1975 seemed all too
true. While over i oo directives pertaining to the environment
were adopted by the Ec between 1973 and 1988, unanimity
voting requirements and poor implementation ensured that
environmental standards remained low and policy unco-ordinated.
One result of these lowest-common-denominator policy outcomes was that individual states were allowed to set environmental standards higher than those in the EC, as long as these higher
standards were not judged to be designed to restrict trade.
Yet the Commission was unable to police this situation. Some
members, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark,
and the Netherlands faced strong domestic pressures to implement even higher standards than those possible in the EC. Other
governments, such as the United Kingdom, had little interest
in environmental policy, because short river drainage systems,
weather patterns, and the ease of ocean dumping of waste materials obscured environmental problems and limited public
expressions of concern about the environment in that country.
Until recently, little political pressure was brought to bear upon
the government in the United Kingdom to protect the environment.
Even when lowest-common-denominator policies did exist
in the Ec, enforcement of the policies was slow. The question of
subsidiarity between the Ec and its member-governments raises
the issue of competence in environmental policy.8 There is con8 J. Lodge, 'Environment: towards a clean blue-green EC?' in Lodge, ed, The
Community and the Challenge of the Future, 323.
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troversy over whether Community environmental policy should
be implemented at the national or the EC level. In addition,
the Commission's use of directives rather than regulations directives allow states more leeway in implementing EC policies limits the ability of individuals to bring cases to the European
Court ofJustice.9 Finally, the structural problems that the Court
faces in all areas, including the large docket of complaints before
it,restricts timely adjudication of complaints on environmental
policy. While the Court has begun - with the Cassis de Dijon
and other rulings - to take a larger role in EC politics,"' including
the enforcement of environmental standards, the level of noncompliance remains high. Overall, compliance with the EC's
environmental policy can be judged a failure.
The Single European Act of 1987 appeared to be a watershed
in European environmental policy. Partly at the insistence of
the European Parliament, and in recognition of the growing
environmental lobbies in national capitals, articles 130R-T of
Title 7 of the act addressed environmental issues. For the first
time expressly within the treaty itself the Commission was made
responsible for integrating environmental concerns into EC policy. Article 130R specified the goals of Ec environmental policy,
including the preservation and the improvement of the quality
of the environment, the protection of human health, and the
encouragement of the prudent and rational utilization of natural
resources. The policy principles to be used in meeting these
9 D.

Vandenmeersch, 'The Single European Act and the environmental policy of
the European Economic Community,' European Law Review 12(1987), 407-29.
io G. Slynn, 'The concept of the free movement of goods and the reservation for
national action under art. 36 EEC Treaty,' in J. Schwarze, ed, Discretionary
Powers of the Member States in the Field of Economic Policies and Their Limits Under
the EEC Treaty (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1988), 17-24. In the Cassis de Dijon case
the Court ruled that Germany could not exclude French cassis from its market
because it had a different alcohol content than that proscribed for cassis in

German law. In short, like products must be treated the same, even if there are
slight differences in content. The same interpretation has been applied to
margarine, beer, and sausages, effectively striking down narrow national definitions of products which distorted trade. In these rulings, the Court signalled
to member-states that they must obey both the letter and the intent of Community

legislation.
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goals were consistent with those developed under the EAP: preventive action, the polluter pays, rectification at the source of
environmental damage, and the inclusion of environmental concerns in the other activities of the EC. Article 130s specified
the conditions under which qualified majority voting could be
applied in making decisions about environmental policy, and
article 1301 allowed members to maintain higher levels of environmental protection than agreed to in the EC as long as those
standards were not designed to distort trade.
Although the SEA strengthened the powers of the Commission to pursue a European environmental policy, there
remained political difficulties in realizing this power. These difficulties stemmed from a potential contradiction in goals. Title 7
specifies an important environmental constraint upon economic
activity, yet the main thrust of the 1992 programme is to free
markets and stimulate economic activity. This increased economic activity would presumably increase levels of pollution.
The Single European Act thus mandates objectively inconsistent
goals.
The Commission and some member-governments - notably
Germany - argue that growth and environmental goals are not
incompatible." They suggest that growth is possible using the
cleanest available technologies. This is consistent with longstanding environmental policies in the Federal Republic and,
incidentally, places German business in a strong position to
export anti-pollution technology. Other member-states, including the United Kingdom, set overall levels of pollution to be
allowed in a given area, irrespective of the cleanliness of the
technologies being used. This regulatory approach is more likely
to result in higher levels of pollution and leaves the United
Kingdom in a less competitive position in the export of environmental protection technologies after 1992. Therefore, harmonization of environmental policy in the EC is hampered by wide
ii Authors'

interviews in Bonn, January and February i99o.
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gaps in regulatory approaches across members, and the political
difficulties in finding domestic support for compromises. '
Adopting the German regulatory style would place significant
burdens on companies operating in countries using site pollution regulations and enhance German dominance in capital
goods markets. Yet adoption of the site pollution approach or
some compromise between the two will face strong opposition
from highly organized environmental groups in Germany, the
Netherlands, and Denmark - possibly in an unlikely coalition
with exporters of clean technology. The basis for a political
compromise on regulatory form is weak, and national differences in pollution control are likely to continue for some time.
Moreover, development needs constrain concern for the
environment in Spain, Portugal, southern Italy, Greece, and
Ireland. The most significant problems facing these economies
include unemployment and low levels of growth, issues which
attract a broader range of public interest than does the environment. It is largely the tourism industries in these countries which
support environmentally conscious development policies. These
countries, and occasionally the French,' 3 regularly oppose a
greater balance between the market and the environment in the
Ec and often demand exemptions and extensions in meeting
European environmental policies.
The ambiguity in the SEA and the opposition of some member-states to higher environmental standards have led to market
goals being put before environmental goals in the EC. The Directorate General for Environment, Consumer Protection, and
Nuclear Safety (DG xi) must compete within the Commission
12

Lodge, 'Environment: towards a clean blue-green Ec?' 324.

13 French opposition to the imposition of stricter European environmental stan-

dards could until recently be explained mostly by French needs to remain

competitive vis-3-vis the Germans, but the growth of environmental lobbies and
political parties may awaken political concern there as well. For a recent treatment of French environmental politics, see G. Blume, 'Auf der Suche nach einer
umweltpolitischen Moral,' in M. Franken and W. Ohler, eds, Natiirlich Europa
(K61n: K61ner Volksblatt Verlag 1989), 21-30.

146

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

with the Directorates General for Internal Market and Industrial
Affairs, for Energy, and for Agriculture for resources and influence over environmental policy. It is also clear that for the
Commission's president, Jacques Delors, market comes before
environment. Although Mr Delors supported the establishment
of a Community Environment Office,' 4 it has few powers except
as an information service. He suppressed a report prepared by
DG x I which was critical of the environmental implications of the
5
1992 programme.' Mr Delors clearly understands the pressing
priority of environmental protection and feels the growing
influence of environmental lobbies and political parties in the
member-states, but he is unwilling to risk slowing down or sacrificing the 1992 programme in order to balance market and
environmental goals. Therefore he refused to allow the DIG xi's
report to be issued formally, although it was leaked to the environmental community. The expansion of EC powers into the
environmental field would be desirable for the evolution of the
Commission, yet the Commission has clearly placed market
before environment.
The major European interest groups concerned with environmental issues fall on one or the other side of this marketenvironment controversy. The Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE), the main lobbying
group in Brussels for business, supports the market-first orientation of the Commission. This organization argues that 'a sound
economy is a preconditionfor effective environmental protection
6
since it provides the means for paying the costs of clean operations.'"
U N IC E adds that investment incentives are preferable to legislative constraints in the pursuit of environmental policy goals, that
there is a need for increased self-regulation and public support
14 'EG-Umweltpolitik wird prioritat: Prasident Jacques Delors will Europaisches
Umweltamt,' EG Nachrichlen, no 8, 25 April 1989, 2.

15 Authors' interviews in Brussels, 25 January i99o.
16 'European industry and the environment - the fundamental principles of environmental policy,' UN IC E doc IA,:o 89o33/rev., i o October 1989.
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for research and development, worker retraining, and so on,
and that the polluter pays principle is preferable to the collective
burden principle. These positions are all broadly consistent with
a market-first perspective on the environment. The European
Trade Union Confederation (ETUc), the main lobbyist for the

labour movement in Europe, named 'environment and employment' as one of its three main goals for the next three years at
its Milan Conference in 1985. Yet environmental questions were
largely ignored at its follow-on conference in Stockholm in May
1988.17 The confederation pressed for the integration of environmental issues into the general debate concerning the future
of industrial society and for information programmes to show
that environmental protection can create jobs. Nevertheless, the
final report of the Stockholm conference devoted only a few
pages to environmental questions. It would seem that ETUC is
largely constrained by its members, many of whom fear that
stronger environmental standards could cost jobs.
Environmental interest groups in the EC are represented in
Brussels by the European Environmental Bureau (E EB) and the
Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP).' 8 The EEB
represents national environmental groups in Brussels and has
close ties with DG xi in the Commission. It highlights the negative effects of the 1992 programme for the environment, but
finds the Commission largely deaf to its pleas. It has therefore
directed its efforts towards strengthening the pressure upon
national governments to address environmental issues by helping to organize environmental groups in the member-states and
by sensitizing the general public to environmental concerns. The
EEB recognizes that in environmental affairs power still resides
in the national capitals. The I EEP, in contrast, argues that the
1992 programme will lead to higher levels of pollution only a
17 European Trade Union Confederation, Report on Activities 85/87, Stockholm, 913 May 1988.

18 The information in this paragraph is drawn firom the authors' interviews in
Brussels and Bonn, January and February 199

o.
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little earlier than would have been the case without the programme. While it is concerned with environmental protection,
the IEE i emphasizes the differing impacts of the problems on
EC member-states and the varying approaches to their solution
which exist among those members.' 9
Behind these different views of the potential impact of the
1992 programme on the environment lie two radically different
perspectives. On the one side, the representatives of business
and labour, including UNICE and to some extent ETUC, tend to
emphasize the wealth to be generated by the 1992 programme
and to argue that this wealth can then be applied to clean up
the environment. They are inclined to gloss over the differences
in approach to environmental questions among member-states
and the difficulties that these differences are likely to generate
in developing effective European environmental standards and
policies. On the other side is the EEB, which stresses the environmental damage to be expected as a result of the 1992 programme. The 1EEP, while decrying the damage likely to occur
as a result of the programme, notes that this is simply an acceleration of current processes and that national differences in
approach to environmental policy heighten the difficulties in
agreeing on Europe-wide measures to protect the environment.
Capital, and to some extent labour, see the 1992 programme
leading to investment in protecting the environment as a result
of increased growth, whereas the environmental groups emphasize the environmental damage to be caused by the programme.
These groups also note the present difficulties in reaching agreement among the members of the EC, suggesting that even with
increased prdfits after 1992, differing sensitivities and approaches to environmental concerns among EC members limit
the likelihood that increased profits will in fact be spent on
meeting European environmental standards.
19 See, for example, the remarks of Ernst Ulrich von Weizsicker, director of the

ýE
jP, in Europtiische Liga ffir Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Die Europdische
Dimension im Umweltschutz (K61n: Industrie-F6rderung 1988).
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In this political climate, the Commission is relatively free to
pursue market first, environment second policies. While reaching Community-wide environmental standards is somewhat easier with qualified majority voting on some issues, the huge differences among members require low- (but perhaps not least-)
common-denominator types of resolutions. The European Parliament, constrained to play a primarily .advisory role, can do
little to change the priorities of the Commission despite its large
pro-environment bloc of members.
European environmental policy, then, operates in a highly
constrained political milieu. Both the Commission and business
lobbyists clearly place completion of the internal market before
protection of the environment, and the environmental lobbyists
are unable to do much to change this stance. Achieving more
balance between market and environment, as called for in the
Single European Act, would require more pressure from member-governments to pursue this objective, and this requires,
in turn, more effective environmental lobbies in each of the
member-states. The theoretical implication of these observations
is an emphasis on the primary role of states in decision-making.
This constellation of political forces offers little hope for development of a European environmental policy, a judgment that
raises the question of sovereignty transfer. To determine if,
despite these political and institutional constraints, the Ec has
been able to acquire sovereignty from its members in the area
of environmental policy, we will explore the Ec's handling of
two environmental issues: waste management and air pollution.
THE EC AND WASTE MANAGEMENT

One of the main goals of the SEA process is the elimination
of border controls. The 1992 programme envisions a Europe
without borders, where goods, services, money, and people may
move freely without the time-consuming checks and delays now
experienced at most border crossings. Such an open Europe
generates the potential, as well, of states with low environmental
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standards becoming dumping grounds for wastes, including
hazardous materials. Without the border checks, companies may
be tempted to ship their wastes about Europe until a likely dump
site is found in a country where government officials either do
not know or do not care what is dumped where. This so-called
waste tourism has in the past generated strong public concern,
beginning in 1976 when an explosion at a chemicals plant covered the Italian town of Seveso with large amounts of cancercausing dioxins. The control of waste shipments is thus one of
the key issues in any European environmental policy.
The EC has tried to implement waste management policies
since 197 5 . Its first efforts were overly broad and were directed
primarily at Community-level disposal of toxic and non-biodegradable materials. The Action Programme of 1977 significantly
expanded the scope of Commission activities in the area of waste
management to include the reduction of the quantity of nonrecyclable waste, increased recycling efforts, and the disposal of
non-recyclable wastes. However, there were significant enforcement problems, and a number of waste disposal scandals heightened the sense that the EC was not able to force compliance
upon its members. One partial success was the emphasis during
the 198os upon clean technologies, with the Commission supporting pilot projects demonstrating the feasibility of new technologies which minimized environmental degradation.
One of the EC'S major failures was over the discharge of
wastes into the sea. Several governments, notably that of the
United Kingdom, have effectively blocked efforts to regulate
dumping at sea. While the highly publicized deaths of large
numbers of seals in the North Sea galvanized public attention
to force an agreement limiting such dumping in 1988, the British
have since applied for temporary extensions on its implementation, and there is evidence that the dumping continues. In this
case, initiatives-for new policy came solely from member-govern20

For a detailed description of EC waste policy, see S.P. Johnson and G. Corcelle,
The Environmental Policy of the European Communities (London: Graham and
Trotman 1989), 158-86. This analysis draws in part upon their work.
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ments, yet implementation has been blocked by member-governments.
Implementation of the Seveso directive has been equally
hampered by national governments. Passed in 1982, this directive lays down regulations concerning the handling and storage
of hazardous materials. In the first five years after its passage,
only a handful of member-governments implemented the directive, and full implementation remains elusive.21 The foot-dragging evident in this case - despite the Seveso scandal - is indicative of the implementation problems already experienced in the
run-up to 1992 and demonstrates that member-states retain
considerable control over environmental policy.
After a warehouse full of inadequately stored dioxin was
found in northern France, the EC adopted regulations in 1984
requiring members to inform each other of the shipment of
hazardous wastes to prevent waste tourism. It is unclear to what
extent these requirements are being observed. Differences in
storage and dumping standards, despite the Seveso directive,
raise the possibility that some member-states will become, willingly or not, the dumping ground for others. There is some
evidence, for example, that German firms are holding back on
investments in new facilities to process hazardous wastes until
after 1992, in the hope that less expensive means - meaning
dumps in other states with lower environmental standards - can
be found to dispose of the material.22
One reason why waste tourism is likely to increase after 1992
arises from the position taken by the Ec on the definition of
wastes. The Commission views wastes as a good and waste treatment as a service. That is, the free movement of wastes around
Europe is defined in the same terms as the movement of services,
washing machines, or skilled labour. Hence, restrictions upon
the free movement of wastes are considered inconsistent with
the goals of the 1992 programme. Because the harmonization
21

'Brussels takes a strong lead,' Financial Times (London), 6 March 1987.

22 'Die Wirtschaft wird vomn Binnennmarkt profitieren,' Handeisblalt, 26 January

1989.
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of waste disposal laws will be difficult and time-consuming, it

seems likely that waste tourism will grow after 1992. There is
sentiment both within the Commission and in some memberstates that wastes should be dealt with at the facility closest to
the site of their generation,23 but no Community-wide policy has
yet been proposed by the Commission.
Clearly, then, the EC'S efforts in the area of waste management have been limited. This is in part a function of the late
inclusion of environmental concerns in the EC treaties and in
part of the difficulty the Commission experiences in forcing
compliance with EC directives. The Commission's definitions of
waste and waste management are also indicative of its market
first, environment second views. The overriding constraint upon
EC policy regarding wastes is that the primary power still resides
in the member-states, and there are significant differences of
view among the members about the political salience of the issue.
AIR POLLUTION AND

1992

The (suppressed) assessment of the environmental impact of the
1992 programme put together by DG x I suggests that increased
air pollution will be one of the major problems generated by the
opening of markets in Europe. The report finds that air pollution from the two main sources, use of vehicles and generation
of electricity,24 will grow after 1992. Using the Commission's
own models of the economic effects of the 1992 programme,25
the report finds that, even if existing environmental standards
were fully implemented, levels of sulphur dioxide will rise by 8
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G. Bennett et al, The Internal Market and Environmental Policy in the Federal Republic
of Germany and the Netherlands (Brussels: Institute for European Environmental
Policy, November 1989), 94.
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The report suggests that 6o per cent of all sulphur dioxide, 8o per cent of
nitrogen oxides, 55 per cent of carbon dioxide, and 40 per cent of non-methane
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hydrocarbons emissions come from these two sources. See Directorate General
for Environment, Consumer Protection, and Nuclear Safety, The Environment and
the Internal Market: Challenges and Opportunities, nd.
That is, those used to develop the projections in the Cecchini Report. See P.
Cecchiis, The European Challenge i9gg: The Benefits of a Single Market (Brussels:
The Commission 1988).

ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY IN THE EC

153

to 9 per cent by 201o and levels of nitrogen oxide by 12 to 14
per cent.
The implementation of the 1992 programme will lead to
more air pollution from vehicles for several reasons. First, with
the projected opening of borders, the movement of goods will be
easier, and trade within the EC will grow. Much of this increased
trade will be carried by truck, adding to current vehicle-based
pollution. Even if increased integration of the transportation
sector might partly offset these increases in air pollution,26 the

overall impact is likely to be negative. Additionally, the opening
of hitherto closed transportation markets is likely to stimulate
transportation by truck rather than by train. Rail has been losing
out to road shipment for several years, and there is no Europewide effort to reverse this trend.
The second major source of air pollution is energy production. The effects of 1992 in the energy sector are mixed. On
the one hand, a Europe-wide market in some energy sectors particularly oil refining - already exists, and 1992 is likely to
have a minimal impact there. In other sectors, such as the market
for electricity, significant national barriers continue to distort
trade.27 The problem is not simply the desirability of national

self-reliance in energy production despite the air pollution generated by oil- and coal-fired plants. The possibility of France
marketing electricity generated by its nuclear power plants to
Germany has raised concerns among anti-nuclear groups as
26

The transportation industry is one of the most heavily protected industries in
Europe. In Germany, for example, foreign shippers are limited to a few thousand permits per year, leading to many instances in which trucks return empty
from trips because they do not receive all additional permit to carry goods on

the way back. Hence, a freeing of this market would allow carriers to be loaded
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most of the time, cutting back upon the number of unloaded trips - and the
air pollution generated by these trips. Most estimates, though, find that the
increased traffic resulting from the internal market will more than offset the
increased efficiency arising from the elimination of the permit system. See The
Environment and the Internal Market.
Authors' interviews in Brussels, 9 November 1988; K. Matthies, 'Deregulierung
des Energiemarktes?' in O.G. Mayer, H. Scharrer, H. Schmahl, eds, Der Europiische Binnenmnarkt: Perspektiven und Probleme (Hamburg: Verlag Weltarchiv
1989), 175-94.
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well.2S While the transborder shipment of electricity is likely to
affect only border regions initially, the likelihood is growing of
long-term effects resulting from the movement of electricity
generation from countries with high air pollution standards to
those with lower standards.
The EC initially made very little progress on the regulation of
air pollution following the first directives to control air pollution
approved by the Council in I 98o. Johnson and Corcelle attribute
these delays to the oil crisis and the ensuing scarcity of low
sulphur oils. They add that there was considerable opposition
to controls over industrial air pollution from the larger members
of the EC, including Germany.29 Since 198o, however, the effects
of acid rain have become more widely known, and more attention is being paid to air pollution in Europe.
Regulation of air pollution from vehicles has focused upon
two issues, the reduction of emissions through re-engineering,
including the use of catalytic converters, and the elimination of
lead in gasoline. The Danish veto of auto emissions standards
proposed in 1985 (because they were not stringent enough)
pushed members to tighten the controls.3o In June 1988, when
the qualified majority voting rules of the SEA had taken effect,
a coalition was found in the Council in favour of strict standards
for all autos over 1.4 litres. Limits on emissions for diesel engines
had been agreed upon shortly before. These standards were
tightened in June of 1989 to include all cars and to require the
use of catalytic converters. 3 ' Eliminating lead in gasoline has
proven more difficult. Current Ec regulations call for the grad28 For analysis of such fears in Germany, see Bennett et at, The Internal Market and
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ual elimination of lead in gasoline, but individual members may
not impose their own (higher) standards on transborder shippers and must provide them with the same types of gasoline
available in their home countries.32
Control of emissions from electricity generating plants has
been slow. Initial Commission proposals were tendered in 1983,
but a compromise could be reached only five years later. This
understanding allowed several members, including Italy, Great
Britain, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece, extra time to meet
the new standards.
Much as in the case of waste management, the initiative for
stronger environmental standards regarding air pollution rests
in the hands of member-governments. In contrast to the waste
case, though, the high political saliency of air pollution problems
has given the EC some additional leeway in pushing for Europewide solutions. That air pollution cannot be stopped at borders,
as can solid wastes, heightens the need for pan-European remedies. However, the compromises reached tend to reflect the
demands of the foot-draggers in the Ec.
CONCLUSIONS

This paper has analysed the role that environmental policy plays
in the EC and its 1992 programme in order to shed light on the
growing debate between scholars who emphasize the growing
sovereignty of the EC and those who stress the continued independence of the nation-state. Various constraints upon the
development of environmental policy were examined, and the
development of Community policy in the areas of waste management and air pollution was briefly explored. It was found that
there are two main constraints upon the development and
implementation of environmentally sound policies for Europe.
One is the focus within the Commission on completing the inter32 C. Hey and J. Jahns-Boehm, Okologie und Freier Binnenmarki, a study prepared

for the Oko-Institut Freiburg and the European Environmental Bureau (Freiburg: Schwartz auf Weiss 1989), 98-9.
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nal market at all costs, including if necessary environmental
ones. The second is the continued dominance of national governments in the development of European policy in general.
It is clear that completion of the internal market is higher
up on the Commission's political agenda than is protection of
the environment. The Commission's president was unwilling to
tolerate criticism - or what might in some circles be used as
criticism - of the 1992 programme when the directorate general
concerned explored the environmental impact of completing
the internal market. Mr Delors's position is supported by European business, and, at least in part, by the European Trade
Union Confederation. The inclusion of environmental concerns
in the Single European Act was clearly not enough to ensure
that a balance would be struck between market and environment. The Commission's definition of waste and waste management in market terms is an example of the implications of the
emphasis on the internal market over other goals. While it can
be argued that market and environment are not disparate goals,
in practice it seems that they are treated by the major actors in
European politics as if they are. This helps the nation-state
maintain its competence in environmental issues.
The second constraint upon a European environmental policy is the continued dominance of nation-states in decision-making. Political power in the EC remains in the hands of its members. Even when agreements are reached at the European level,
governments are often able to negotiate long adjustment periods, and there is some evidence that violations continue even
after these adjustment periods have expired. Many of the directives passed by the Ec allow considerable variance among members in acceptable levels of pollution, and monitoring remains
largely in the hands of member-governments. This is clearly the
case in the area of air pollution.
The question remains: what would happen if the Commission were to focus more vigorously upon the environment? It
seems unlikely that this would lead to any greater progress
towards co-operative environmental policy. Unlike the case with
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the opening of markets, there is little shared perception of concern among EC members. While most can agree upon the need
to address global environmental problems such as ozone depletion, it is more difficult to find common ground on more localized problems such as dumping at sea or waste tourism.
This analysis suggests several important implications for our
understanding of regional integration. First, these data do not
support the neo-functionalist emphasis upon spillover as the
source of institutional change in the EC. The process by which
the Commission acquires more competence still runs first and
foremost through national capitals. Further, these data suggest
that national capitals retain much of their influence over EC
policy, particularly when the Commission relies on directives
rather than regulations to enact European policies. Clearly, the
more controversial the issue, the more likely it is that the Commission will provide members with significant leeway on implementation, with the consequence that power continues to rest
in national capitals. As a number of scholars have noted, harmonization in the EC is more difficult that lowering barriers. The
use of directives to lessen the conflict over harmonization, however, allows trade- and investment-distorting national policies
to remain in place and defeats efforts to create a common market
in Europe. The differences between negative integration (lowering of barriers) and positive integration (harmonization of policies) do become narrower over time. Finally, the EC remains
first and foremost a business association. The expansion of EC
sovereignty outside of narrowly defined market areas and into
broader issues including environmental protection is problematic. The impetus for change in the EC comes from 6lite groups
such as business or from heads of state, and not from nationally
based environmental groups. This reaffirms the importance of
the nation-state and the continuing difficulty in developing
Europe-wide views of environmental problems.
What this suggests is a European Community which is mostly
a forum within which states can pursue their own independent
foreign policies, in coalition with others when necessary or con-
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venient. Such a view of the EC is at loggerheads with the initial
formulations of integration theory as well as some of its more
recent reformulations. This analysis suggests the need for caution in assessing the implications of the 1992 programme for the
question of sovereignty. While 1992 will certainly bring about
significant changes in Europe, substantial transfers of sovereignty from the nation-state to the Ec and its institutions cannot
be expected.

